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Abstract
We consider a two-player game in which one player can take a
costly action (i.e., to provide a favor) that is beneficial to the other.
The game is infinitely repeated and each player is equally likely to be
the one who can provide the favor in each period. In this context,
equality matching is defined as a strategy in which each player counts
the number of times she has given in excess of received and she gives
if and only if this number has not reached an upper bound.
We show that the equality matching strategy is simple, self-enforcing,
symmetric, and irreducible. Furthermore, we show that the utility for
each player is at least as high under equality matching as under any
other simple, self-enforcing, symmetric, and irreducible strategy of the
same complexity. Thus, we rationalize equality matching as being an
efficient way to achieve those properties.
This result is applied to risk sharing in village economies and used
to rationalize the observed correlations between individual consump-
tion and individual income and between present and past transfers
across individuals.
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1 Introduction
People that live in the villages of developing countries typically have a low
and highly volatile income. In the absence of insurance and credit markets,
informal institutions have developed there in order to allow for some risk
sharing across individuals. In fact, people in village economies transfer a
significant part of their income in order to assist those who have received a
low income (see, for example, Fafchamps and Lund (2003)).
This practice of transferring part of one’s income to assist others is an
example of the equality matching form of sociality defined in Fiske (1992). In
this form of behavior, each person maintains a balance, which increases one
unit when she takes a costly action and decreases one unit when she benefits
from a costly action taken by another person. This balance is then used to
decide whether or not she should take a costly action again: she will take it
if and only if the balance has not reached an upper bound. In the case of the
village economies, people not only transfer part of their income to those in
need (typically, referred to as a form of positive reciprocity), they also stop
giving if the other never reciprocates, or does not reciprocate enough (a form
of negative reciprocity). Indeed, as Fafchamps and Lund (2001, p. 28) have
shown, there is a significant negative correlation between current and past
transfers received by individuals in their sample.
Why do we observe equality matching? Is there a sense in which this
form of behavior is optimal? While one can easily explain the positive reci-
procity aspect of equality matching through repeated interaction, is it the
case that we can understand both its positive and negative aspect as being
simultaneously part of an optimal equilibrium behavior?
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In this essay, we provide an answer to these questions. We consider an
infinitely repeated two-player game with no discounting in which one player
can take a costly action (i.e., provide a favor) that is beneficial to the other,
and in which each player is equally likely to be the one who can provide
the favor in every period.1 Several authors have pointed out that many real
life institutions are self-enforcing, treat individuals symmetrically, cannot be
simplified, and their rules are simple to understand. Following their work, we
define a social institution as a repeated game strategy with those properties.
Then, we show that the equality matching strategy satisfies those properties
in an optimal way: the welfare of each player is at least as high under the
equality matching strategy as under any other social institution of the same
complexity. Hence, in this sense, equality matching is an optimal social
institution.
Most of the properties we focus on are standard. We follow Schotter
(1981, p. 24) in defining a social institution by a repeated game strategy.
Following the work of Aumann (1981), and Selten (1975) respectively, we say
that a strategy is simple if it can be represented by a finite automaton and
is self-enforcing if it is subgame perfect.2 The complexity of an automaton
1Thus, this game is a symmetric repeated dictator game, where by “symmetric” we
mean that in every period each player is equally likely to be the dictator. Naturally, we
assume that the benefit is higher than the cost of the action.
2An automaton is described by a set of states (one of which is specified to be the initial
state), by a transition function (which gives the next period’s state as a function of the
current period’s state and actions), and by a behavior function (which prescribes behavior
according to the state of the automaton). As Kalai and Stanford (1988) have shown, an
automaton is an equivalent way of describing a strategy, and so throughout this paper the
two terms will be used synonymously.
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is defined as the size of the state space as in Rubinstein (1986). Finally, an
automaton is symmetric if players use the same state space, initial state and
transition function and if players in the same situation play the same action.3
This notion is similar to that in Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite (1995).
While the other properties we use require little comment, it is useful to
discuss in some detail the concept of irreducibility. Formally, an automaton
is irreducible if all its states can be reached from any other state. Note that
in a reducible automaton, there is a state s′ that is never reached from a
state s. Therefore, the automaton can be simplified when it reaches state s
by reducing state s′ in a way that it produces the same outcome. Thus, only
irreducible automata may be impossible to simplify.
Furthermore, we argue that irreducibility discards some strategies that
are based on empty threats when players care about the complexity of the
strategy they use. We illustrate this point using the grim-trigger strategy,
which can be represented by a two-state automaton with a cooperative state
and a punishment state (see Kalai (1990, p. 141)). Consider suggesting
to the players that they use grim-trigger. Player 1 could then reason as
follows: “Player 2 is using grim-trigger; if I did so as well then a favor is
provided in every period. However, if I use grim-trigger, I have to study the
history of the play in every period to determine whether someone has failed
to provide a favor in the past. I do not like to do that. Fortunately, there
is a better alternative: I do not look at the history, and I always provide
3We impose still an additional condition. As explained in footnote 8, an automaton
with the above properties induces a Markov chain on the set of states; in our definition of
symmetry, we require that its transition matrix be symmetric. See Section 2 for further
discussion.
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a favor when I can. This leads exactly to the same outcome, hence payoff,
and I do not have to bother to check what has happened in the past. I will
do this instead of grim-trigger.” This argument shows that, if players care
about complexity, then grim-trigger is not an outcome we should expect:
each player simply does not have an incentive to play it because he has a
less complex alternative way of obtaining the same payoff. This happens
precisely because grim-trigger is not irreducible, since the punishment state
is never reached from the cooperative state.4
In the particular context of village economies, a further reason for irre-
ducibility is that people may not want those who fail to reciprocate to be
severely punished. This may be the case since the people with whom any
person interacts are typically family members or close, long-term friends.
But what can “not too severely punished” mean? A possible meaning is
that nothing unusual happens if one deviates from the equilibrium strate-
gies. More precisely, that the actions taken after someone fails to reciprocate
when he should (i.e., outside the equilibrium path) are also taken regularly
in the regular course of the game (i.e., on the equilibrium path). But this is
clearly implied by irreducibility.
In conclusion, if we accept that social institutions are represented by fi-
nite, subgame perfect, symmetric and irreducible automata, then we can
rationalize equality matching as an optimal social institution. Furthermore,
in the particular case in which the costly action consists of transferring part
of an individual’s endowment, equality matching implies a particular pattern
4Formally, irreducibility is a necessary condition for semi-perfection, an equilibrium
concept developed by Rubinstein (1986).
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of individual consumption and transfers that is consistent with observed cor-
relations in village economies. In fact, it implies some risk sharing, which
is not complete due to its negative reciprocity aspect. Moreover, it im-
plies a positive correlation between individual consumption and current and
lagged individual income (documented in Townsend (1994), among others)
and a negative correlation between current and past transfers among individ-
uals (reported, for instance, in Fafchamps and Lund (2003) and La Ferrara
(2003)).
2 Related Literature
The rationale for equality matching is also analyzed by Abdulkadirog˘lu and
Bagwell (2005). They study a repeated trust game with incomplete informa-
tion and, for most of the paper, they focus on payoffs that lie on a symmetric
self-generating line. They show that equality matching can be specified by a
symmetric self-generating line although not by the highest one. Nevertheless,
they show that the highest symmetric self-generating line can be implemented
in a way that reflects an intertemporal balancing of favors. The difference
between equality matching and this implementation is that the size of the
favor owed diminishes in neutral periods where no player can provide a favor,
but other than that, this optimal implementation is consistent with equal-
ity matching (accordingly, it was named sophisticated equality matching by
Abdulkadirog˘lu and Bagwell (2005)).
Compared to the work of Abdulkadirog˘lu and Bagwell (2005), our results
have the advantage of rationalizing equality matching exactly as described in
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Fiske (1992) and in a complete information environment. This latter feature
is important since this seems to be a reasonable assumption in the context of
village economies. However, this requires a strengthening of the equilibrium
concept, namely the introduction of irreducibility.
The conclusion that it is reasonable that the size of the favor owed di-
minishes in neutral periods is also reached by Hauser and Hopenhayn (2004)
in a model similar to the one in Abdulkadirog˘lu and Bagwell (2005) except
that time is continuous.5 Furthermore, they show that players would improve
their well-being if the rate of exchange between favors received and conceded
were to change with players’ balance (recall that in the equality matching
form of behavior described in Fiske (1992) this rate is always one).
In our model there is always a player that can provide a favor. However,
equality matching would still be optimal even if we relaxed this assumption.
The reason why the size of the favor owed does not diminish in neutral peri-
ods in our model is due to no discounting. Hence, there is no contradiction
between our results and those of Abdulkadirog˘lu and Bagwell (2005) and
Hauser and Hopenhayn (2004), which depend on discounting. We can also
interpret this difference in the results as suggesting that, in certain circum-
stances, the no-discounting case provides a better description. This seems to
be the case not only in the examples provided by Fiske (1992), but also for
risk sharing in village economies: in fact, as Fafchamps and Lund (2003) have
shown, in their sample of rural Filipino households, risk is shared through
zero-interest informal loans with an open-ended repayment period. This is
5That equality matching is a (Markov perfect) equilibrium in such a model was estab-
lished first by Mo¨bius (2001).
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just a form of equality matching in which there is no decrease in the amount
owed.
The reason why the dependence of the rates of exchange on the balance
is not part of the optimal equilibrium is due to our symmetry assumption. In
particular, this assumption requires that the transition matrix of the Markov
chain induced by an automaton be symmetric. If we drop this requirement,
which is not an intuitive economic condition, then it is possible to obtain a
strategy that yields a higher payoff to both players. For instance, let players’
possible values for their balance be any integer from 0 to 4 and let favors
provided increase the balance by 2 units if the balance of the player providing
it is 0 and by 1 unit otherwise. This change in the rate of exchange makes
favors more likely (since they take place unless the player that can provide
it has a balance of 4), thus increasing players’ payoffs.
However, the increase in the payoff obtained by dropping the above condi-
tion does not come without costs. In fact, this strategy is harder to sustain as
a subgame perfect equilibrium and so one needs to add an extra assumption.
Indeed, a player (say, player 1) could deviate by providing a favor only when
the “price” is high. This implies that the probability of reaching a balance
higher than 2 for player 1 is zero starting from a balance less than or equal
to 2. Hence, in the long run, player 1 is providing favor at a price of 2 and
receiving then at a price of 1. The disadvantage is that favors are less likely.
However, if the difference between the benefit of receiving a favor and the
cost of providing it is not sufficiently high, then the deviation is profitable.
In contrast, the only assumption needed to support the equality matching
strategy with a rate of exchange identically equal to one is simply that such
9
difference be strictly positive.
Our results are also related to those regarding risk sharing in village
economies. When applied to this problem, our framework is similar to that
in Kocherlakota (1996), except for the following differences: we consider no-
discounting, an indivisible good, no aggregate uncertainty (in fact, there are
only two equally likely states and each player has a positive endowment in
only one of them), and, of course, a stronger equilibrium concept. The advan-
tage of our theory is that it has the potential to generate stronger correlations
between individual consumption and individual income, current and lagged,
and between current and past transfers. In particular, it generates non-zero
correlations even if consumers are extremely patient. This is in contrast to
the main results of Kocherlakota (1996) since: first, if players are sufficiently
patient, they predict that those correlations equal zero; second, as Koeppl
(2006) and Rinco´n-Zapatero and Santos (2006) have shown, this can still be
the case even if players are sufficiently impatient.
3 The Model
There are two players that interact in every period t ∈ N. In every period,
one of them can provide a favor to the other; we assume that this is decided
by nature, in a way that each player has in every period a 1/2 probability of
being the one who can provide the favor.
When a player provides a favor, he suffers a utility cost d > 0, and the
player receiving it obtains a positive utility u > 0. If the favor is not provided,
then both players receive zero utility. We assume that favors are efficient in
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the sense that their benefit exceeds their cost. That is, we assume that u > d.
Let N = {1, 2} stand for the set of players, Ω = {1, 2} for the set of states
of nature, and A = {P,NP} for the set of possible actions. We make the
convention that when the state of nature equals 1, only player 1 can provide
a favor, and so he chooses an action from the set A; similarly, when the
state of nature equals 2, player 2 is the one who can provide the favor. The
payoffs, which players receive period-wise, and which depend on the state of
nature and on the choice made by the player who can provide the favor, are
summarized in the following table:
ω\a P NP
1 −d, u 0,0
2 u,−d 0,0
Table 1: Stage Game Payoffs
We denote the period-wise payoffs as ui(ω, a).
We describe the behavior of each player in the repeated game by an
automaton. An automaton for player i is a triple Ii = ((Si, s¯i), Ti, Bi) where:
Si is a set of states ; s¯i ∈ Si is the initial state; Ti : Ω × Si × A → Si is a
transition function; and Bi : Si → A is a behavior function.
A pair of individual automata I = (I1, I2), or for short, an automaton,
together with a sequence of states of nature ω = {ωk}∞k=1 ⊆ Ω induce a
sequence of actions a(I,ω) = {ak}∞k=1 ⊆ A in the following way: a1 =
Bω1(s¯ω1), and ak = Bωk(s
k
ωk
), where ski = Ti(s
k−1
i , ak−1), for both i = 1, 2.
6
6Recall that player i is the producer in period k if ωk = i, for all i = 1, 2.
11
For ωn ∈ Ωn, we define the n−dimensional vector a(I, ωn) in a similar way
and let ak(I, ω
n) denote its kth coordinate for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n.
Each player’s payoff in the repeated game depends on the payoff he re-
ceives in all periods, in the following way: first, for i = 1, 2, and n ∈ N, we
define a function Uni (I) : Ω
n → R by defining
Uni (I)(ω
n) =
1
n
n∑
k=1
ui(ωk, ak(I, ω
n)), (1)
and we define
Uni (I) =
1
2n
∑
ωn∈Ωn
Uni (I)(ω
n). (2)
Then, payoff of an automaton I for player i, i = 1, 2, is
Ui(I) = lim sup
n→∞
Uni (I). (3)
By using the above payoff function, we are assuming that players are
extremely patient. In fact, as shown below, the payoff of any irreducible
automaton equals the limit, as the discount factor goes to one, of the payoffs
computed using the discounted sum criterion. Since players incur a cost
whenever they provide a favor, favors will occur in equilibrium only if players
are sufficiently patient. By using the above payoff function, we are able to
present our results in a clearer way, while allowing us to simplify some of the
proofs.
4 Equality Matching
In our framework, it is natural that players choose to provide favors, at least
at some times. However, since this is costly, the provision of favors will not
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be unconditional. One possible way of conditioning the provision of favors is
described by the equality matching form of sociality.
Under equality matching, a player will provide a favor if and only if he
has not given much more than he has received in the past. In other words,
the player that can provide a favor bases his decision on the number of times
he has given in excess of received, and chooses to provide it whenever this
number is below a certain threshold.
Formally, an equality matching automaton IM = (I
M
1 , I
M
2 ) with a threshold
M ∈ N is defined as follows: the set of states is
SM1 = S
M
2 = SM = {0, . . . ,M}, (4)
and the initial state is s¯M ∈ SM .7 The transition function TM1 = TM2 = TM :
Ω× SM × A→ SM is defined by:
TM(1,m, P ) =
 m+ 1 if m ≤M − 1,M if m =M (5)
TM(2,m, P ) =
 m− 1 if m ≥ 1,0 if m = 0 (6)
TM(ω,m,NP ) = m, (7)
The interpretation is as follows: s ∈ SM represents the balance of player
1. Whenever player 1 provides a favor, her balance increases by 1 unit, except
when this balance has reached the upper bound M . Similarly, whenever she
receives a favor, her balance decreases by 1 unit, except when it has reached
7Two equality matching automata are distinct if and only if they differ in their initial
state. Since players do not discount the future, the initial state does not play any role in
our analysis.
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0. Since player 2’s balance is just M − s, the latter case occurs exactly when
player 2’s balance has reached the upper bound.
Player 1’s behavior function is defined by:
BM1 (m) =
 P if m < M,NP otherwise; (8)
Similarly, Player 2’s behavior function is defined as follows:
BM2 (m) =
 P if m > 0,NP otherwise; (9)
Intuitively, any player provides a favor if and only if the other player has a
positive balance, which occurs if and only if his own balance has not reached
the upper bound. The definition of IM does describe equality matching in
the sense that each player takes costly actions that benefit the other, but will
stop doing so if this other player does not reciprocate enough.
Note that the equality matching automaton satisfies many symmetry
properties. First, we have that players use a common state space, initial
state, and transition function: SM1 = S
M
2 , s¯
M
1 = s¯
M
2 , and T
M
1 = T
M
2 . Second,
some states can be associated in a natural way: if we define φ(m) =M −m,
we obtain a bijection φ : SM → SM , satisfying BM1 (m) = BM2 (φ(m)). Third,
the equality matching automaton induces a Markov chain on SM , described
by a symmetric transition matrix. In fact, if ΠM denotes such a matrix, one
easily sees that the nonzero entries of ΠM are:
pi0,0 =
1
2
, pi0,1 =
1
2
pim,m−1 =
1
2
, pim,m+1 =
1
2
, for all 0 < m < M
piM,M−1 =
1
2
, piM,M =
1
2
.
(10)
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Generalizing from the particular case of the equality matching automaton,
we say that an automaton I = (I1, I2) is symmetric if: (1) S1 = S2, T1 = T2,
and s¯1 = s¯2; (2) there exists a bijection φ : S → S such that B1(s) =
B2(φ(s)); and (3) I induces a Markov chain on S, described by a symmetric
transition matrix.8 Intuitively, the class of symmetric automata consists of
those in which different individuals in the same situation determined by the
realization of the uncertainty and with the same state are prescribed by the
same action.
5 Equality Matching as an Optimal Social In-
stitution
In our model the two players interact in every period of time. This inter-
action is described by an automaton I, which consist of a pair of individual
automata: I = (I1, I2). By changing each player’s automaton, we obtain
different outcomes, some of which may be unreasonable.
The first requirement we impose on the automaton that players use is
that it is self-enforcing. More precisely, we will require that each player,
given the other player’s behavior, has an incentive to act in the way that the
8Note that any finite automaton I satisfying (1) induces a Markov chain on S defined
by the following transition matrix Π:
piss′ =

1 if T (ω, s,Bω(s)) = s′ for all ω = 1, 2,
0 if T (ω, s,Bω(s)) 6= s′ for all ω = 1, 2,
1
2 otherwise.
(11)
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automaton prescribes for all possible contingencies. Formally, this amounts
to requiring that the automaton is a subgame perfect equilibrium.
Before giving the formal definition, we need the following notation: given
an automaton I = ((S, s¯), T, B), then (I, s) = ((S, s), T, B) denotes the
automaton that differs from I only in the initial state. We then say that
an automaton I is a subgame perfect equilibrium if for all i = 1, 2, s in
S = S1 × S2, and any player i’s automaton I ′i with initial state s′, we have
that
Ui(I, s) ≥ Ui((I ′i, I−i), (s′, s−i)). (12)
A second requirement we impose is that there are no obsolete states: all
states should be used regularly in the regular course of the game. As Rubin-
stein pointed out “[these] considerations have some similarity to phenomena
frequently observed in real life: social institutions, various types of organiza-
tions, and human abilities degenerate or are readily discarded if they are not
used regularly.” Formally, we say that a symmetric automaton I is irreducible
if the Markov chain induced by I is irreducible.9
The view that we take here is that, in our framework, only automata that
are finite, symmetric, subgame perfect, and irreducible can describe a social
institution. For N ∈ N, let AN be the set of all symmetric, irreducible, sub-
game perfect automata with a state space having no more than N elements.
Our main result is:
Proposition 1 For all N ∈ N, every equality matching automaton IM , with
9A Markov chain represented by a transition matrix Π is irreducible if for all states s,
and s′ there exists K ∈ N such that pi(K)s,s′ > 0.
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M = N − 1, solves
max
I∈AN
U1(I) + U2(I).
Proposition 1 asserts that not only is the equality matching automaton
a symmetric, irreducible, subgame perfect automaton for any possible upper
boundM , but in fact, it is efficient within that class. In particular, any finite,
symmetric, irreducible, subgame perfect automaton can be (weakly) domi-
nated by the equality matching automaton of the same level of complexity.
In this sense, equality matching is an optimal social institution.
6 Risk Sharing in Village Economies
As an application of the framework in Section 3, we consider the problem
of risk sharing in village economies (see, among others, Kocherlakota (1996)
and Ligon, Thomas, and Worrall (2002)). This application is particularly
interesting since there is considerable empirical evidence that can be used
to test our results. As Proposition 2 below states, if players use equality
matching, then the correlation between current individual consumption and
current and lagged income is positive. Furthermore, it implies that current
individual net transfers are negatively correlated with the previous period’s
individual net transfers.
The model is like the one in Section 3. There are two players who interact
in every period n ∈ N. In every period, each person receives an endowment
of a single perishable and indivisible consumption good. The pair of endow-
ments belongs to {(0, 2), (2, 0)}, that is, one person receives 2 units of the
good while the other receives 0. The endowments are determined by na-
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ture: the set Ω = {1, 2} denotes the set of states of nature. The relationship
between endowments and the state of nature is as follows: if ω = 1 then
y = (y1ω, y
2
ω) = (2, 0), while if ω = 2 then y = (0, 2). The values of ω ∈ Ω are
drawn independently and are equally likely, i.e., each occurs with probability
equal to 1/2. Note that the aggregate endowment Y = y1 + y2 is always
equal to 2, i.e., there is no aggregate uncertainty.
The two individuals interact in the following way. At the beginning of
each period n ∈ N they are informed about the current value of ω. Then, the
player with 2 units of the good can choose to transfer 1 unit of his current
endowment to the other. We let tiω,t denote the transfer made by individual
i in state of nature ω in period n; it has to satisfy 0 ≤ tiω,n ≤ yiω and
tiω,n ∈ {0, 1}. Once the decision regarding transfers is made, each individual
consumes ciω,n = y
i
ω − tiω,n + t−iω,n. The net transfer received by player 1 is
θω,n = t
2
ω,n − t1ω,n.
Individuals have the same period-wise utility function defined on con-
sumption levels u : {0, 1, 2} → R. We let u(0) = 0, u(1) = u and u(2) = u+d
and assume that u > d > 0. In this way u is strictly increasing and satisfies
the following form of strict concavity:
u(0) + u(2)
2
=
u+ d
2
< u = u(1) = u
(
0 + 2
2
)
. (13)
For all i = 1, 2, we define ui : Ω× A→ R as follows:
ui(ω, t) = u(y
i
ω − ti + t−i). (14)
This game is the same as the one in Section 3: only one player can choose
to transfer; if she does, she loses d (since she consumes 1 unit instead of 2)
and the other player gains u (he consumes 1 unit instead of 0). Thus, the
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player with a high endowment is, effectively, like the player who can provide
a favor in the model of Section 3 and the costly action that she can take is
to transfer one unit of her endowment to the other player. Therefore, we can
define equality matching in the same way as before, and use Proposition 1
to conclude that for all N ∈ N, every equality matching automaton IM , with
M = N − 1, solves maxI∈AN U1(I) + U2(I).
This behavior, in turn, implies that the pattern of consumption and trans-
fers satisfies the following properties.
Proposition 2 For every equality matching automation IM , there exists α >
0 such that
1. cov(c1t , y
1
t−k|Yt−k) > 0 and
2. cov(θt, θt−1|Yt−1) < 0
for all t ≥ α and 0 ≤ k ≤ t− α.
It is easy to explain why this behavior leads to a positive correlation
between current individual consumption and current and lagged income. If
a consumer has a zero balance, she can consume if and only if she receives
a positive endowment. Also, a consumer with a zero endowment today and
a zero balance yesterday can consume today if and only if she received a
positive endowment yesterday. Thus, the equality matching form of behavior
can make current individual consumption and current and lagged individual
income move together. A similar intuition holds for transfers.
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7 Concluding Remarks
The main point of the paper is that the equality matching form of sociality
can be regarded as an optimal social institution. When applied to a simple
risk sharing problem, this conclusion provides an explanation for the observed
correlations between individual consumption and individual income, current
and lagged, and between current and past transfers in village economies.
As explained in Section 2, these correlations are stronger than those pre-
dicted in Kocherlakota (1996), at least when there is little or no discounting.
Unfortunately, it may be hard to empirically distinguish these two theories.
It can, nevertheless, be tested in the situation where there is evidence that
players are sufficiently patient.
Furthermore, they can also be tested by using experiments to find out how
players behave out of the equilibrium path. For instance, the experimental
subjects could be told that there has been a history of plays before they
start. Evidence on how players play out of the equilibrium path can be used
to distinguish the two approaches since, in contrast to the equality matching
strategy, the optimal strategy in Kocherlakota (1996) predicts that those
who fail to transfer as prescribed by the equilibrium strategies will remain in
autarky for at least a long period.
Just as experimental evidence can be useful to better understand our re-
sults, these can also be used to comment on some recent experimental studies
on village economies. One such study was done by Henrich, Boyd, Bowles,
Camerer, Fehr, Gintis, and McElreath (2001), who report experimental re-
sults on the one-shot ultimatum game played in fifteen village economies.
They found that the mean offers were substantially above zero, ranging from
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25 to 50 percent of the stake size, despite the fact that the game was played
just once and anonymously, and players were randomly matched.
Perhaps more importantly, they have shown that this behavior is consis-
tent with the typical everyday-life behavior in these economies. This observa-
tion suggests that repeated-game effects in experiments may be more subtle
than what is generally considered. Even if players understand that they are
playing a one-shot game, their behavior may be guided by the social norms of
their society, which are designed for everyday, repeated interaction. Hence,
their behavior will reflect not the optimal one-shot behavior, but rather the
optimal choices in familiar, recurrent situations that are similar to the game
being played.
Furthermore, as Kandori (1992) and Ellison (1994) have shown, we can
expect deviations from optimal one-shot behavior even when a large popu-
lation interacts in an anonymous, random matching way. Hence, the fact
that players in experiments play the game anonymously and are randomly
matched with other players may not be enough to test one-shot games.
If one accepts that the experimental evidence in Henrich et al. (2001)
reflects the behavior induced by optimal institutions, then our results can
be used to reconcile it with the canonical economic model of self-interested
players. In fact, our results imply that we should expect that people in village
economies transfer a considerable amount of their resources if they behave in
the way predicted by the optimal equilibrium in our model of self-interested
players.
However even if people are naive and play games by following their in-
stinct and their emotional impulses, it is still likely that their choices reflect
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the social institutions and culture of the society they live in. If, in fact,
the social institutions that endure are those that are simple, self-enforcing,
symmetric, and irreducible in an efficient way, then, the behavior of any in-
dividual will be well described by the canonical model, even if he is naive
and not completely self-interested.
A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
In this appendix, we prove Proposition 1. The first step of the proof is to show that
any equality matching automaton is symmetric, irreducible, and subgame perfect.
One easily sees that any equality matching automaton is symmetric. Since any
state can lead to the two adjacent states, with the convention that both state 0 and
state M are adjacent to themselves, one can conclude that any equality matching
automaton is irreducible.
To show that each equality matching automaton IM is a subgame perfect
equilibrium, we will start by considering the case in which players’ payoff in the
repeated game equals
U δi (ω,a) = (1− δ)
∞∑
k=1
δkui(ωk, ak), (15)
for all i, where δ ∈ (0, 1), ω = {ωk}∞k=1 ⊆ Ω, and a = {ak}∞k=1 ⊆ A. Existing
results guarantee that if IM is subgame perfect for all discount factors close to 1,
then IM is subgame perfect in our game.
The following lemma estimates the benefit for a given player i of having a
larger balance (which also implies that the other player will have a smaller one).
It shows that, with probability 1, either player i receives exactly one more favor
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or provides exactly one less favor.
Lemma 1 Let m ∈ {0, . . . ,M − 1}. Then there is αm ∈ (0, 1) such that
lim
δ→1
1
1− δ (U
δ
i (IM ,m+ 1)− U δi (IM ,m)) = αmu+ (1− αm)d,
for i = 1, 2.
Proof. Because player 1’s case is symmetric to player 2’s, we deal only with
the first.
Step 1: Some definitions.
Denotem(0) = (m+1,M−m−1) andm′(0) = (m,M−m). Also, let Ω := Ω×
Ω×... be the countable infinite Cartesian product of Ω, and let (Ω,G, µ) denote the
usual corresponding probability space. A generic element of Ω is denoted by ω =
{ωt}∞t=1, where ωt ∈ Ω, for all t ∈ N. Given ω, letm(k)(ω) = (m1(k)(ω),m2(k)(ω))
denote the balance players have at the end of stage k if they started with m(0) and
let m′(k)(ω) denote the balance players have at the end of stage k if they started
with m′(0).
With this notation, we can write
1
1− δ (U
δ
1 (IM ,m+ 1)− U δ1 (IM ,m)) =
1
1− δ
(∫
Ω
U δ1 (IM ,m+ 1)(ω)dµ−
∫
Ω
U δ1 (IM ,m)(ω)dµ
)
=
1
1− δ
(∫
Ω
[
U δ1 (IM ,m+ 1, )(ω)− U δ1 (IM ,m)(ω)
]
dµ
)
,
(16)
where the last equality follows because both of the functions ω 7→ U δ1 (IM ,m)(ω)
and ω 7→ U δ1 (IM ,m+ 1)(ω) are integrable.
Step 2: There exists {At, Bt}∞t=1 such that 11−δ (U δ1 (IM ,m+1)−U δ1 (IM ,m, )) =∞∑
t=1
dδt−1µ(Bt) +
∞∑
t=1
uδt−1µ(At).
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Let A1 := {ω ∈ Ω : m1(1)(ω) = 0 and ω1 = 2}; in A1 player 1 is able to
receive a favor under m but not under m′. Note also that m(1) = m′(1). So, for
ω ∈ A1, the difference in payoffs is u. That is, for ω ∈ A1,
U δ1 (IM ,m+ 1)(ω)− U δ1 (IM ,m)(ω) = (1− δ)u. (17)
Let B1 := {ω ∈ Ω : m′2(1)(ω) = 0 and ω1 = 1}; in B1 player i has to provide a
favor under m′ but not under m. Note also that m(1) = m′(1). Thus, for ω ∈ B1,
U δ1 (IM ,m+ 1)(ω)− U δ1 (IM ,m)(ω) = (1− δ)d. (18)
We proceed by induction: let t ≥ 2. Let
At := {ω ∈ Ω\((
t−1∪
k=1
Ak) ∪ (
t−1∪
k=1
Bk)) : m1(t)(ω) = 0 and ωt = 2)} (19)
and
Bt = {ω ∈ Ω\((
t−1∪
k=1
Ak) ∪ (
t−1∪
k=1
Bk)) : m′2(t)(ω) = 0 and ωt = 1}. (20)
Similarly as before, we have that for ω ∈ At,
U δ1 (IM ,m+ 1)(ω)− U δ1 (IM ,m)(ω) = (1− δ)δt−1u, (21)
and for ω ∈ Bt,
U δ1 (IM ,m+ 1)(ω)− U δ1 (IM ,m)(ω) = (1− δ)δt−1d. (22)
Finally let C = Ω\
[( ∞∪
t=1
At
)
∪
( ∞∪
t=1
Bt
)]
.
For each t ∈ N, At is measurable since it can be written as D1×· · ·×Dt×Ω×
Ω × · · · for some D1, . . . , Dt ⊆ Ω. Similarly, Bt is measurable for each t ∈ N and
so is C. Note also that for all j, k ∈ N, we have that Aj ∩Ak = ∅, Bj ∩Bk = ∅ and
Aj ∩Bk = ∅.
Claim 1 µ(C) = 0.
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Proof. Let Sn(ω) be the number of times that ωk = 1 in the first n periods.
If ω ∈ C, then it follows that m1(k)(ω) > 0 whenever ωk = 2, for all k. Therefore,
n−Sn (which equals the number of times that ωt = 2) is also the “amount spent”
by player 1 in the first n periods. Since the “amount received” by player 1 in the
first n periods is at most Sn, then for each n ∈ N, m1(0) + Sn ≥ n − Sn, that is
Sn/n ≥ 1/2 −m1(0)/2n. Hence C ⊆
∞∩
n=1
{ω ∈ Ω : Sn(ω)n ≥ 12 − m1(0)2n }, which has
measure zero by lemma 2 applied to the sequence of random variables {Xn}∞n=1,
where for all n, Xn(ω) = χ{ω: ωn=1}.
Hence, we obtain
1
1− δ (U
δ
1 (IM ,m+ 1)− U δ1 (IM ,m)) =
1
1− δ (
∞∑
t=1
∫
At
[U δ1 (IM ,m+ 1)(ω)− U δ1 (IM ,m)(ω)]dµ+
+
∞∑
t=1
∫
Bt
[U δ1 (IM ,m+ 1)(ω)− U δ1 (IM ,m)(ω)]dµ) =
∞∑
t=1
uδt−1µ(At) +
∞∑
t=1
dδt−1µ(Bt).
(23)
Step 3: There exists αm ∈ (0, 1) such that
lim
δ→1
1
1− δ (U
δ
1 (IM ,m+ 1)− U δ1 (IM ,m)) = αmu+ (1− αm)d. (24)
By Abel’s theorem (see DePree and Swartz (1988, Theorem 11.17, p. 135)),
lim
δ→1
1
1− δ (U
δ
1 (IM ,m+ 1)− U δ1 (IM ,m)) = dµ(
∞∪
t=1
Bt) + uµ(
∞∪
t=1
At). (25)
So define αm := µ(
∞∪
t=1
At). Finally note that µ(
∞∪
t=1
At) ≥ (12)m(0) > 0, µ(
∞∪
t=1
Bt) ≥
(12)
M−m(0), (
∞∪
t=1
At)∩ (
∞∪
t=1
Bt) = ∅ and that Ω = (
∞∪
t=1
At)∪ (
∞∪
t=1
Bt)∪C implying that
µ(
∞∪
t=1
At) + µ(
∞∪
t=1
Bt) = 1.
The following lemma was used above:
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Lemma 2 Let {Xn}∞n=1 be a sequence of independent and identically distributed
random variables with mean equal to ρ ≤ 12 and finite variance σ2 > 0 and let
c ∈ R. Then µ( ∞∩
n=1
{ω : Sn(ω)n ≥ 12 − cn}) = 0.
Proof. The result will follow from the Law of Iterated Logarithms: Let
{Yk}∞k=1 be independent and identically distributed random variables with E[Y1] = 0
and σ2(Y1) = 1. Then lim infn→∞ Sn√2n log logn = −1 almost surely (see Billingsley
(1995, Theorem 9.5, p. 154)).
Define Yn(ω) =
Xn(ω)−ρ
σ and S
y
n(ω) =
∑n
k=1 Yk(ω). Then
Syn(ω)
n =
1
σ
(
Sn(ω)
n − ρ
)
.
By the Law of Iterated Logarithms, there is Z ⊂ Ω with µ(Z) = 0 such that
lim infn→∞
Syn(ω)√
2n log logn
= −1, for all ω ∈ Ω \ Z. Let ω ∈ Ω \ Z. Then, since
infn≥k
Syn(ω)√
2n log logn
increases to lim infn→∞
Syn(ω)√
2n log logn
, it follows that infn≥k
Syn(ω)√
2n log logn
≤
−1, for all k ∈ N. That is, Syn(ω)√
2n log logn
≤ −1 infinitely often. Thus, for n large
enough,
Sn(ω)
n
≤ ρ− σ
√
2 log log n√
n
<
1
2
− c
n
(26)
infinitely often (the last inequality follows because, for n large enough, we have
that c < σ
√
2n log log n→∞). It follows then that ω /∈ ∞∩
n=1
{ω : Sn(ω)n ≥ 12 − cn};
hence
∞∩
n=1
{ω : Sn(ω)n ≥ 12 − cn} ⊆ Z and the result follows.
It is useful to use the discounted version of our game to show that IM is
subgame perfect, because in discounted games we can use the one-shot deviation
principle (see Abreu (1988).) For the particular case of an equality matching
automaton, we need to show that it is not profitable for a player to refuse to
provide a favor when the other has a positive balance, and to follow the equality
matching strategy afterwards.
If a player deviates by not providing a favor when the other has a positive
balance, his utility increases today by d, i.e., he gains by not having to provide the
favor. However, he starts the next period with one less unit on his balance, and
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the other player starts with one more unit. Thus, the following Lemma follows
from Lemma 1.
Lemma 3 There exists δ∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that for all δ ∈ (δ∗, 1), IM is subgame
perfect.
Proof. By Proposition 3.11 of Mertens and Parthasarathy (1987)) (or Proposi-
tion 1 of Abreu (1988)) it is enough to show that no player can profitably deviate
from IM by deviating just in the first stage. Again, because player 1’s case is
symmetric to player 2’s, we deal only with the first.
It is clear that player 1 does not want to deviate from BM1 (M) = NP , since
by choosing P when his balance equals M he would reduce his utility today by d,
and receive the same future utility. So we are left with showing that he does not
want to deviate from BM1 (m), for all m = 0, . . . ,M − 1.
Let m ∈ {0, . . . ,M − 1}. If player 1 deviates from BM1 (m), and therefore
chooses NP , his utility will be equal to
U¯ := (1− δ)δU δ1 (IM ,m), (27)
while if he does not deviate, his utility will be equal to
U δ1 (IM ,m) = (1− δ)(−d+ δU δ1 (IM ,m+ 1)). (28)
Thus,
U δ1 (IM ,m)− U¯ = (1− δ)
[
−d+ δ 1
1− δ (U
δ
1 (IM ,m+ 1)− U δ1 (IM ,m))
]
. (29)
By lemma 1,
− d+ δ 1
1− δ (U
δ
1 (IM ,m+ 1)− U δ1 (IM ,m)) →
δ→1
→
δ→1
−d+ αmu+ (1− αm)d > 0.
(30)
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Therefore, if we let δ∗ be such that for all δ > δ∗
−d+ δ 1
1− δ (U
δ
1 (IM ,m+ 1)− U δ1 (IM ,m)) > 0 (31)
for all m ∈ {0, . . . ,M − 1}, then
U δ1 (IM ,m)− U¯ > 0 (32)
for all m ∈ {0, . . . ,M − 1}.
The second step of the proof is to show that Ui(IM ) ≥ Ui(I) for any i = 1, 2,
and any symmetric, irreducible, and subgame perfect automaton I with |S| ≤
|SM |. The following Lemma uses standard ergodic theorems for Markov chains to
compute the payoff of any symmetric, irreducible, and subgame perfect automaton.
Lemma 4 Let I ∈ AN . Then,
Ui(I) =
1
2 |S|
∑
s∈S
∑
ω∈Ω
ui(ω,B(s)). (33)
Proof. Let I ∈ AN , and let S˜ = Ω× S. Then I also induces a Markov chain
Π˜ on S˜ satisfying
p˜ii,j = pii2,j2 , (34)
for all i = (i1, i2), and j = (j1, j2) in S˜.
Since Π is symmetric and irreducible, then so will be Π˜. Denoting s˜1 = (1, s¯1),
and s˜2 = (2, s¯2), we have that
Uni (I) =
1
2n
n∑
k=1
∑
(ω,s)
p˜i
(k)
s˜1,(ω,s)
ui(ω,B(s)) +
1
2n
n∑
k=1
∑
(ω,s)
p˜i
(k)
s˜2,(ω,s)
ui(ω,B(s)). (35)
By Theorems A.1, and A.4 of Derman (1970), we have that
lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
k=1
p˜i
(k)
s˜i,(ω,s)
=
1
2 |S| , (36)
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for i = 1, 2, since the uniform distribution is the unique stationary distribution of
Π˜. Thus,
Ui(I) = lim
n→∞U
n
i (I) =
1
2 |S|
∑
s∈S
∑
ω∈Ω
ui(ω,B(s)). (37)
The following lemma states that in any subgame perfect equilibrium there has
to be a “punishment” state, which, in our model, corresponds to a player refusing
to provide a favor.
Lemma 5 Let I ∈ AN . Then, for all i = 1, 2, there exists s ∈ S such that
Bi(s) = NP.
Proof. Suppose that for some i ∈ {1, 2}, we have Bi(s) = P, for all s ∈ S. Let
I˜−i be such that B−i(s) = NP, for all s ∈ S, which implies that U−i(Ii, I˜−i) = u/2.
Suppose, in order to reach a contradiction, that I−i 6= I˜−i. Since I ∈ AN , then by
lemma 4 we obtain
U−i(I) ≤ u2 −
d
2|S| < U−i(Ii, I˜−i), (38)
a contradiction since I is a subgame perfect equilibrium. Thus, I−i = I˜−i, and so
Ui(I) = −d/2.
However, letting I˜i be such that Bi(s) = NP, for all s ∈ S, we obtain
Ui(I˜i, I−i) = Ui(I˜) = 0 > Ui(I). This shows that Ii is not a best response to
I−i, which is a contradiction.
With the above lemmas, we can prove Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 1. Let N ∈ N be given, and let M = N − 1. We first
establish that IM belongs to AN . It is clear that IM is symmetric, and since, for
all m ∈ SM ,
pi
(M)
mM ≥ pimm+1 · · ·piM−1M︸ ︷︷ ︸
M−m terms
piMM · · ·piMM︸ ︷︷ ︸
m terms
> 0. (39)
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we obtain that for all m,m′ ∈ SM ,
pi
(2M)
mm′ ≥ pi(M)mMpi(M)Mm′ > 0; (40)
that is, the Markov Chain induced by IM is irreducible.
Finally, to show that IM is a subgame perfect equilibrium, we proceed as
follows: Let i = 1, and s ∈ SM . Given IM2 , player 1 faces a Markovian decision
problem, where the state space is S˜ = Ω × S, the initial state is either (1, s)
or (2, s), each with 1/2 probability, and the transition probabilities ql,j(a) are as
follows: let l = (ω,m); if either ω = 2 or ω = 1, and a = P , then for all m ∈ SM ,
ql,j(a) =

1
2 if j = (1, TM (ω,m,Bω(m)))
1
2 if j = (2, TM (ω,m,Bω(m)))
0 otherwise.
(41)
If ω = 1, and a = NP then for all m ∈ SM ,
ql,j(a) =

1
2 if j = (1,m)
1
2 if j = (2,m)
0 otherwise.
(42)
By Corollary 3.1 in Derman (1970), there exists a finite automaton I∗1 that is a best
reply to IM2 at state s. By Theorem A.1 in Derman (1970) and Abel’s Theorem
(see DePree and Swartz (1988, Theorem 11.17, p. 135)) we have that U1(IM , s) =
limδ→1 U δ1 (IM , s), and also that U1((I∗1 , IM2 ), s) = limδ→1 U δ1 ((I∗1 , IM2 ), s). By Lemma
3, it follows that U1(IM , s) ≥ U1((I∗1 , IM2 ), s). Hence, IM1 is a best reply to IM2 at
state s. Using an analogous argument for i = 2, we conclude that IM is a subgame
perfect equilibrium.
It is left to show that U1(IM ) + U2(IM ) ≥ U1(I) + U2(I) for all I ∈ AN . For
each I ∈ AN , recall that by Lemma 4 we have
Ui(I) =
1
2 |S|
∑
s∈S
∑
ω∈Ω
ui(ω,B(s)). (43)
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Let SP = {s ∈ S : B2(s) = P} and SNP = {s ∈ S : B2(s) = NP}. By
symmetry, |SP | = |{s ∈ S : B1(s) = P}| and |SNP | = |{s ∈ S : B1(s) = NP}| .
Then, we obtain
U1(I) =
1
2 |S|
(∑
s∈S
u1(1, B(s)) +
∑
s∈S
u1(2, B(s))
)
=
1
2 |S| (−d |SP |+ u |SP |) =
|SP |
|S|
u− d
2
.
(44)
Because I is a subgame perfect equilibrium, |SNP | ≥ 1, and so |SP | = |S| −
|SNP | ≤ |S| − 1. Hence, it follows that,
U1(I) ≤ u− d2
(
1− 1|S|
)
≤ u− d
2
(
1− 1
M + 1
)
= U1(IM ). (45)
Since, by symmetry, U2(IM ) = U1(IM ) ≥ U1(I) = U2(I), the result follows.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Since Yn(ω) = 2 for all n ∈ N and ω ∈ Ω, we have that cov(c1t , y1t−k|Yt−k) =
cov(c1t , y
1
t−k) for all 0 ≤ k < t.
For convenience, let µn denote the uniform measure on Ωn, i.e., µn(ωn) = 2−n
for all ωn ∈ Ωn.
By definition,
cov(c1t , y
1
t−k) =
∑
ωt∈Ωt
1
2t
(c1t (ω
t)− c¯1t )(y1t−k(ωt)− y¯1t−k) (46)
where y¯1t−k = 1. If qt(s) denotes the probability that in period t the state is
s ∈ {0, . . . ,M}, then, c¯1t = 1+ (qt(M)− qt(0))/2. Since limt→∞ qt(s) = 1/(M +1)
for all s, then c¯1t → 1. Hence, we may compute cov(c1t , y1t−k) using c¯1 = 1 instead
of c¯1t , by considering t sufficiently large.
Let σ1(s) denote the probability that the state st is s and ωt−k = 1; similarly,
let σ2(s) denote the probability that the state st is s when ωt−k = 2. We have
that σi(s) = µt({ωt ∈ Ωt : ωt−k = i and st(ωt−1) = s}) for i = 1, 2.
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If ωt = 1, st =M and ωt−k = 1 then y1t−k = 2, c
1
t = 2 and so
(c1t (ω
t)− c¯1)(y1t−k(ωt)− y¯1t−k) = 1.
Similarly, if ωt = 1, st =M and ωt−k = 2 then y1t−k = 0, c
1
t = 2 and so
(c1t (ω
t)− c¯1)(y1t−k(ωt)− y¯1t−k) = −1.
Given ωt = 1, in all remaining cases we have
(c1t (ω
t)− c¯1)(y1t−k(ωt)− y¯1t−k) = 0,
since c1t (ω
t) = 1 = c¯1.
For the case ωt = 2 we obtain
(c1t (ω
t)− c¯1)(y1t−k(ωt)− y¯1t−k) =

−1 if st = 0 and ωt−k = 1,
1 if st = 0 and ωt−k = 2,
0 otherwise.
(47)
Then,
cov(c1t , y
1
t−k) =
σ1(M)− σ2(M)
2
+
σ2(0)− σ1(0)
2
. (48)
Thus, it is enough to show that σ1(M) ≥ σ2(M) and σ2(0) > σ1(0).
For any s ∈ SM and ωk−2 = (ωt−k+1, . . . , ωt−1) let {sij(s, ωk−2)}tj=t−k+1 denote
the sequence of states resulting from having state s in period t−k and ωt−k = i for
i = 1, 2. Using the definition of TM , one easily sees that s1j (s, ω
k−2) ≥ s2j (s, ωk−2)
for any j, s and ωk−2. So, given s ∈ SM , if ωk−2 is such that s1t (s, ωk−2) = 0, then
s2t (s, ω
k−2) = 0. Similarly, if ωk−2 is such that s2t (s, ωk−2) =M , then s1t (s, ωk−2) =
M . This implies that σ1(M) ≥ σ2(M) and σ2(0) ≥ σ1(0). Hence, it is enough
to show that there exists s ∈ SM , possible to reach at period t − k starting from
s¯M , for which the following holds: there exists ωk−2 such that s1t (s, ωk−2) > 0 and
s2t (s, ω
k−2) = 0 since this implies σ2(0) > σ1(0).
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Let t ≥ α and 0 ≤ k ≤ t−α, i.e., t−k ≥ α. By choosing α > 0 sufficiently large,
any state s ∈ SM can be reached at period t−k starting from s¯M : simply take ω = 2
in the beginning in order to get to s = 0, then continue with ω = 2 to keep s = 0
until period t−k−s−1, and take ω = 1 from period t−k−s until period t−k−1. If
k is odd, let st−k = 0 and ωk−2 = (1, 2, 1, 2, . . .). This will produce s1t (s, ωk−2) = 1
and s2t (s, ω
k−2) = 0. If k is even, let st−k = 1 and ωk−2 = (2, 1, 2, 1, . . .). Again,
this will produce s1t (s, ω
k−2) = 1 and s2t (s, ωk−2) = 0. This completes the proof
that cov(c1t , y
1
t−k|Yt−k) > 0.
Finally, we show that cov(θt, θt−1) < 0 if t is sufficiently large.
Since tiω,n ∈ {0, 1} for all n ∈ N and ω ∈ Ω, then
θ¯t = µt({ωt : st(ωt) > 0 and ωt = 2})− µt({ωt : st(ωt) < M and ωt = 1})
=
1− qt(0)− 1 + qt(M)
2
=
qt(M)− qt(0)
2
.
(49)
Letting θ¯ = 0, it follows that θ¯t converges to θ¯ and so we can use θ¯ to compute
cov(θt, θt−1) by considering t sufficiently large.
Note that (θt(ωt)− θ¯)(θt−1(ωt)− θ¯) = θt(ωt)θt−1(ωt) and that
θt(ωt)θt−1(ωt) =

1 if st(ωt) > 0, st−1(ωt) > 0, ωt = 2 and ωt−1 = 2,
1 if st(ωt) < M, st−1(ωt) < M,ωt = 1 and ωt−1 = 1,
−1 if st(ωt) > 0, st−1(ωt) < M,ωt = 2 and ωt−1 = 1,
−1 if st(ωt) < M, st−1(ωt) > 0, ωt = 1 and ωt−1 = 2.
(50)
Since, if ωt−1 = 2, then both st > 0 and st−1 > 0 if and only if st−1 > 1, it
follows that
µt(st > 0, st−1 > 0, ωt = 2, ωt−1 = 2) =
µt(st > 0, st−1 > 0, ωt−1 = 2)
2
=
µt(st−1 > 1, ωt−1 = 2)
2
=
∑M
s=2 qt(s)
4
.
(51)
Similarly, if ωt−1 = 1, then both st < M and st−1 < M if and only if st−1 <
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M − 1. Thus, it follows that
µt(st < M, st−1 < M,ωt = 1, ωt−1 = 1) =
µt(st < M, st−1 < M,ωt−1 = 1)
2
=
µt(st−1 < M − 1, ωt−1 = 1)
2
=
∑M−2
s=0 qt(s)
4
.
(52)
If ωt−1 = 1, then both st > 0 and st−1 < M if and only if st−1 < M . Thus, it
follows that
µt(st > 0, st−1 < M,ωt = 2, ωt−1 = 1) =
µt(st > 0, st−1 < M,ωt−1 = 1)
2
=
µt(st−1 < M,ωt−1 = 1)
2
=
∑M−1
s=0 qt(s)
4
.
(53)
Finally, if ωt−1 = 2, then both st < M and st−1 > 0 if and only if st−1 > 0.
Thus, it follows that
µt(st < M, st−1 > 0, ωt = 1, ωt−1 = 2) =
µt(st < M, st−1 > 0, ωt−1 = 2)
2
=
µt(st−1 > 0, ωt−1 = 2)
2
=
∑M
s=1 qt(s)
4
.
(54)
It then follows that cov(θt, θt−1) converges to
− lim
t→∞
qt(1) + qt(M − 1)
4
= − 1
2(M + 1)
. (55)
Hence, if t is sufficiently large, we conclude that cov(θt, θt−1) < 0.
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